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Schiavone: An Un-Fortune-ate Illustration of the Supreme
Court's Role as Interpreter of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure
Joseph P. Bauer*
Let me identify the two basic theses of this paper. First, I believe
that in the recent Schiavone v. Fortune I case, the Supreme Court gave the
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure under consideration there, Rule 15(c),
an unduly restrictive reading. In this, the fiftieth year of the effective
date of the Rules, it is particularly unfortunate to see any of the Rules
given an unnecessarily grudging interpretation. My second assertion is
that as a general matter, in interpreting the Federal Rules, courts should
recognize that their role is different from the one they play in interpreting statutes or in applying substantive common law doctrines, regardless
of whether they are of a federal or state nature. In construing the Federal Rules, the courts are interpreting standards which the Supreme
Court itself has promulgated. Therefore, some of the problems which
occur during statutory interpretation, such as ferreting out legislative intent, deferring to another branch of the government, or avoiding violations of principles of federalism by deferring to state interests, are in
large measure eliminated. As a result, the federal courts are fully justified in taking an expansive view of the Federal Rule under scrutiny, giving it a liberal reading if that is required to fulfill the purposes of the
Rule or to do justice between the parties before the court.
The inappropriate view of its role in interpreting the Federal Rules
that the Supreme Court took in Schiavone is perhaps better understood by
contrasting it against an even more recent Supreme Court decision in
which the Court was required to examine the federal statutory scheme
respecting removal and remand-Carnegie-Mellon University v. Cohill.2 A
brief review of the facts of these two cases will illustrate the problem.
In Schiavone, the plaintiffs brought a diversity action in the federal
district court in New Jersey, asserting that they had been libeled by an
article that had appeared in an issue of Fortune Magazine, which is published by Time, Incorporated. The offending publication had taken place
about May 15, 1982, and New Jersey-whose statute of limitations was
applicable to the action-required that the action be brought within one
* Associate Dean and Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School. A.B. 1965, University of
Pennsylvania; J.D. 1969, Harvard University. I wish to express my appreciation to Hon. Robert
Miller (U.S. Dist. Ct., N.D. of Ind), Prof. Robert Rodes, and Prof.John Attanasio (Notre Dame Law
School) who offered helpful comments on drafts of this paper; and to my research associate, Ms.
Kathryn Young, Notre Dame Law School Class of 1989, for her valuable assistance.
1 477 U.S. 21 (1986). This case is discussed in Note, Schiavone v. Fortune: A Clarificationof the
Relation Back Doctrine, 36 CATH. U.L. REv. 499 (1987); Note, Schiavone v. Fortune: Notice Becomes a
Threshold Requirementfor Relation Back under Federal Rule 15(c), 65 N.C.L. REv. 598 (1987).
2 108 S. Ct. 614 (1988).
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year of the publication.3 The plaintiffs' complaints were filed with the
district court on May 9, 1983-well within the statutory period. The
complaints were then mailed to Time's registered agent in New Jersey on
May 20, and they were received by the agent on May 23.
The complaints had named Fortune as the defendant and had described it as a New York corporation. In fact, however, Fortune is only a
trademark and the name of an internal division of Time, Incorporated.
Because Time was not named as a defendant, its agent refused to accept
service of process.
Once the plaintiffs learned of their mistake, they amended their
complaints to reflect the correct identity of the defendant, 4 and in midJuly, they served the amended complaints on Time, Incorporated. The
defendant then made a motion to dismiss the amended complaints, arguing, among other things, that the action was barred by the statute of
limitations.
Under Rule 15(c), an amendment which changes the identity of a
party is permitted to relate back if, among other requirements-and here
close attention to the precise language of the Rule is critical-"within the
period provided by law for commencing the action against the party to be
brought in by amendment" that new party received notice of the institution of the lawsuit and knew (or should have known) that, but for the
mistake, it would have been named as the defendant. 5
The district court held that the requirements of Rule 15(c) were not
satisfied, and so it granted the defendant's motion to dismiss. On appeal,
the Third Circuit affirmed and, in a six to three decision, the United
States Supreme Court affirmed that decision.
As just indicated, if, as the Supreme Court's majority concluded, the
case was deemed to involve a change in the identity of the defendant-as
opposed to the mere correction of a "misnomer"-its outcome turned
on what was meant by the words "within the period provided by law for
commencing the action."' 6 One possible interpretation is that this phrase
3 Under NewJersey law, the date on which the statute of limitations begins to run is the first day
of substantial publication. Although there were grounds for varying that date by a few days, publication occurred sometime between May 11 and May 19, 1982. Schiavone, 477 U.S. at 24 n.4.
4 Under Rule 15(a), since the defendant had not yet answered the complaint, the plaintiffs were
entitled to make one amendment as a matter of course, i.e., without receiving permission either from
the defendant or with leave of the court.
5 The relevant portion of Rule 15(c) [which was amended in 1987 to make it gender neutral]
provided as follows:
Whenever the daim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading. An amendment
changing the party against whom a claim is asserted relates back if the foregoing provision
is satisfied and, within the periodprovided by lawfor commencing the action against him, the party to
be brought in by amendment (1) has received such notice of the institution of the action
that he will not be prejudiced in maintaining a defense on the merits, and (2) knew or
should have known that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the
action would have been brought against him.
FED. R. Crv. P. 15(c) (emphasis added). The first sentence was the original Rule 15(c), dating to
1988. The second sentence was added in 1966.
6 Justice Stevens' dissent first asserted that the case did not even involve this portion of Rule
15(c), but rather only its first sentence, see supra note 5, since the plaintiffs were not attempting to
"chang[e the party against whom a claim is asserted," but rather were merely correcting a "misno-
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refers to the statutory period for starting the lawsuit-here, for example,
the New Jersey one year statute of limitations for libel actions. However,
under Rule 3 of the Federal Rules, while an "action is commenced by
filing a complaint with the court," 7 Federal Rule 4(j) provides that a
plaintiff has 120 days after the filing of the complaint to accomplish service of process. 8 The laws of the majority of states also allow various
additional lengths of time for completing service of process.9 Thus,
since an action is not actually commenced against a defendant until he or
she has in fact been served, another interpretation of this disputed
phrase in Rule 15(c) is that it refers to the statutory period plus the 120
days permitted by Rule 40)1 0-or the additional time allowed under state
law-for serving the summons and complaint. 1 1
In resolving this question, the majority did what courts too often do
when there are two different meanings that disputed language may have:
It simply stated, ipse dixit, that one of those meanings was "plain." Thus,
Justice Blackmun declared:
We do not have before us a choice between a "liberal" approach
toward Rule 15(c), on the one hand, and a "technical" interpretation
of the Rule, on the other hand. The choice, instead, is between recognizing or ignoring what the Rule provides
in plain language. We ac12
cept the Rule as meaning what it says.
However, the fact that at least two courts of appeals had previously upheld the more "liberal" interpretation argued for by the plaintiffs13 is
merely one piece of evidence that the meaning of this phrase in Rule
15(c) was neither clear nor plain.14
mer" or "misdescription" of the defendant's identity. Schiavone, 477 U.S. at 35-36 (Stevens, J., dissenting). I agree that the dissent's characterization is correct, since the same person-the agent for
Time, Inc.,- received the same notice both before and after the amendment; the amended complaint only changed the defendant's identity from a nonexistent corporate entity to its properly
named corporate owner. However, for the purpose of this paper, I will assume, as did the majority,
that the case did involve bringing in a "new party" and that disposition of the case required consideration of the standard in the second sentence. I nonetheless argue that the Court's interpretation
of the quoted language in Rule 15(c) was needlessly restrictive.
7

FED. R. Civ. P. 3.

8 "If a service of the summons and complaint is not made upon a defendant within 120 days
after the filing of the complaint ....the action shall be dismissed as to that defendant .. " FED. R.
Civ. P. 46):

9 Some states provide specified amounts of time--0 days, 120 days, etc.-for accomplishing
service of process. Others permit a "reasonable" amount of time to notify the defendant. See infra
note 53.
10 In the alternative, since Rule 4(j) was not added until sixteen years after Rule 15(c) was
amended, it could include an additional "reasonable" amount of time to accomplish service of
process.
11 As the plaintiffs and the dissent in Schiavone pointed out, had the original complaints properly
identified the defendant as Time, Inc., it would have been permissible under Rule 40) for the defendant not to have learned of the commencement of the action until early September of 1983.
Since Time in fact received the complaint with the misnomer in late May, 1983, and received the
corrected (amended) complaint inJuly, 1983, it in fact had earlier actual notice than it might have
had, had the plaintiffs never made the mistake of identity.
12 Schiavone, 477 U.S. at 30.
13 See Kirk v. Cronvich, 629 F.2d 404, 408 (5th Cir. 1980); Ingram v. Kumar, 585 F.2d 566, 57172 (2d Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 440 U.S. 940 (1979).
14 See generally Lewis, The Excessive Histy of FederalRule 15(c) and its
Lessonsfor Civil Rules Revision,
85 MiCH. L. REV. 1507 (1987) (exploring history and various alternate interpretations of Rule 15(c)).
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. To bolster its conclusion, the Court then turned to the Notes of the
1966 Advisory Committee, the body responsible for drafting this particular revision of Rule 15(c). In explaining why the Notes were useful for
interpreting the Rule, the Court quoted from one of its prior decisions
for the proposition that "[a]lthough the Advisory Committee's comments do not foreclose judicial consideration of the Rule's validity and
meaning, the construction given by the Committee is 'of weight.' "15
It is noteworthy thatJustice Blackmun's opinion contained no analysis of the merits of either alternative interpretation, nor did it consider
the purpose for which Rule 15(c) had been revised in 1966.16 Instead,
relying on a brief line in these Advisory Committee Notes, as well as on
the comments of the authors of two civil procedure treatises, 17 to support the "plain meaning" of the Rule, the Court concluded that the more
restrictive reading of this phrase was compelled.' 8 .
In contrast to the Court's inflexible approach to the Rules in Schiavone, in Carnegie-Mellon the Court found far greater latitude for adding to
the scope of the remand provisions of Tide 28 of the United States Code.
The plaintiff, William Boyle, a citizen of Pennsylvania, had been an employee of the defendant, Carnegie-Mellon University, which is also located in Pennsylvania. After he was fired, Boyle brought an action in a
state court in Pittsburgh, asserting that his discharge violated both Pennsylvania state law-including a variety of breach of contract and tort theories-and the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act
15 Schiavone, 477 U.S. at 31 (quoting Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438,
444 (1946)) (emphasis added).
The dissent argued that the Advisory Committee comments to revised Rule 15(c) were far more
ambiguous and that other passages in the Notes would support an opposite conclusion. Schiavone,
477 U.S. at 37 n.4 (Stevens,J., dissenting). My principal concern here is not for which opinion gave
the better reading to the Notes, but rather the extent to which these Notes are controlling on the
interpretation to be given to the Rules.
In addition, the quotation from Mississippi Publishingmust be read in context. There, the defendant was complaining that the Rule in question-Rule 4(c)-was impermissibly broad because it allowed the federal courts to expand the provisions for venue and service of process in ways which
went beyond the rulemaking power conferred on the Court by the Rules Enabling Act. In responding to this argument, in the sentence preceding the one quoted in Schiavone, the Court had said:
"The fact that this Court promulgated the rules as formulated and recommended by the Advisory

Committee does not foreclose consideration of their validity, meaning or consistency." Mississippi
Publishing, 326 U.S. at 444. Thus, the quoted sentence means no more than when the Court wishes
to rely on the Advisory Committee's Notes, they are available for support; the converse proposition
- that the Committee's Notes are something like legislative history, which must be given deferential
weight - does not at all follow.
16 In contrast, Justice Stevens' dissenting opinion addressed these purposes and then pointed
out why the Court's result was contrary to these goals. Schiavone, 477 U.S. at 38-39 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
17 3 J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 15.15[4-2], at 15-225 (2d ed. 1985); 6 C. WRIGHT & A.
MIL.ER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1498, at 228 (Supp. 1985).
. 18 Schiavone, 477 U.S. at 31; The Schiavone case may also present a number of Erie-type issues:
To what extent should the federal courts have looked to state law to determine the plaintiffs' right to
change the designation of the defendant? Could the federal courts have permitted a longer time for
commencing an action against Time than the plaintiffs would have had in state court? Should the
time limits of Rule 15(c) be extended if there is more expansive state law with respect to the relation
back doctrine, under which the amendment would have been permissible? May the federal courts
permit relation back if the state law is more restrictive, precluding an amendment under the facts?
See Lewis, supra note 14, at 1507. Since, neither opinion in the Supreme Court addressed these
questions and since they are not directly relevant to the subject matter of this paper-the Court's
role as interpreter of the Federal Rules-they will not be considered further.
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("ADEA"). 19 Based on the presence of the federal claim, the University
filed a timely petition to have the action removed to the United States
District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. Once in federal
court, discovery proceeded, and six months later, the plaintiff determined that there were insufficient grounds to support his age discrimination claim. 20 He therefore made a motion to amend his complaint to
delete this claim. Because there no longer was a federal claim, and because there was also no diversity of citizenship between the parties, Boyle
simultaneously made a motion to have the action remanded to state
court.
The defendant University objected to this second motion, arguing
that by this point in the proceedings, the federal removal and remand
statutes gave the district court only two options-either to retain the action 21 or to dismiss the plaintiff's lawsuit. The University argued that the
removal and remand procedures are purely statutory, and it pointed out
that the statutory scheme contains no provision for remand of a removed
action once the case has proceeded this far along in federal court.
As in Schiavone, close attention to the applicable language is necessary. Section 1447 of Title 28 provides that "[i]f at any time before final
judgment it appears that the case was removed improvidently and withoutjurisdiction, the district court shall remand the case." 2 2 Here, however, the
case was not removed improvidently nor without jurisdiction, but was removed quite properly. Instead, it was subsequent conduct-and perhaps
not totally incidentally, the action of the plaintiff who was seeking remand-that now changed the posture of the action and created the jurisdictional problem. The case raised the question, then, whether a court
could remand an action in the absence of any express statutory authority
for so doing.
19 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). In addition, Boyle claimed that his discharge
violated the Pennsylvania state age discrimination statute. Carnegie-Mellon, 108 S.Ct. at 616.
20 A prerequisite for the assertion of an ADEA claim is that the plaintiff must first have filed a
timely age discrimination charge with a federal or state agency. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 626(d), 633(b)
(1982). It was apparently only after these six months of discovery that the plaintifflearned that the
failure to file a charge with an agency precluded the assertion of his judicial action. Carnegie-Mellon,
108 S. Ct. at 623 (White, J., dissenting).
21 The removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1982), permits removal of a "civil action brought in
a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction." Original
federal jurisdiction over the entire action was predicated on the exercise of pendent jurisdiction, the
test for which-the existence of a common nucleus of operative fact-is articulated in United Mine
Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966). Gibbs also permits a federal court to exercise its discretion to retain jurisdiction over a purely state claim, even after the federal claim disappears. In-Gibbs,
however, the federal claim was not rejected until after the trial had concluded, and the defendant
there had made a motion for ajudgment notwithstanding the verdict. Here, by contrast, the federal
claim disappeared from the action during pre-trial discovery. Gibbs was not relevant to the specific
issue here-the availability of remand-since it involved an action brought originally in federal
court.

22 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (1982) (emphasis added). Another statutory section, 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c)
(1982), provides for removal of an entire case "[w]henever a separate and independent claim or
cause of action, which would be removable if sued upon alone, is joined with one or more otherwise
non-removable claims or causes of action." It further provides that "the district court may determine all issues therein, or, in its discretion, may remand all matters not otherwise within its original
jurisdiction." (emphasis added). The Court in Carnegie-Mellon correctly noted that this particular
removal/remand provision was inapplicable here because the plaintiff's federal and state claims
were not "separate and independent." Carnegie-Mellon, 108 S. Ct. at 621.
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The district court in fact did remand the action, and by an equally
divided court, the Third Circuit affirmed. 23 On appeal to the Supreme
Court, in a five to three decision, Justice Marshall upheld the district
court's authority to remand the action.
My purpose here is neither to examine the particular statutory
scheme nor to debate the correctness of the Court's decision. Rather, I
wish to focus on the instructive comparison between the Court's willingness in Carnegie-Mellon and its unwillingness in Schiavone to read in an
expansive fashion language which controlled the outcome of the
decision.
The Court recognized that the removal statutes provide for remand
in only two situations. 24 The defendant had argued that Congress' failure to confer any authority on the federal courts to remand actions of
this kind-removed cases in which there are pendent state claims-was
evidence of congressional intent to preclude district courts from remanding such actions. 25 Rejecting this argument, the Court instead concluded
that because Congress had not imposed any limitation on judicial remand
authority-either expressly or otherwise-the congressional silence
"cannot sensibly be read to negate the power to remand" 26 in these
27
situations.
As we all know, there are no specific statutory provisions for the pendentjurisdiction doctrine, and the courts have recognized the doctrine as
one which can be implied under the broad federal question authority in
article III and section 1331 of Title 28, United States Code. In essence,
what the Court did in Carnegie-Mellon was to expand the scope of this
doctrine. 2 8 Under this view, pendent jurisdiction not only confers authority on the federal courts to hear mixed federal and state claims,
whether originally or by removal, but also to remand such actions to state
29
courts when such a step would be consistent with its basic principles.
23 The University sought review of the district court's order by seeking a writ of mandamus. A
three judge panel in the Third Circuit, by a split decision, granted the writ. The case was then set
down for reargument en banc, and the panel decision was vacated. The Third Circuit divided evenly
(five to five) on the district court's right to remand, thereby upholding the order. 41 FEP Cas. 1888
(3d Cir. 1986).
24 See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
25 Carnegie-Mellon, 108 S. Ct. at 620. Support for this argument was found in Thermtron Prods.,
Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336 (1976), where the Court held that a district court could not
remand a removed case or claim without specific statutory authorization. Id at 344-45.
In addition to the five judges on the Third Circuit who concluded that remand was impermissible absent specific statutory authorization, at least two other courts of appeals had held that the void
in the statute precluded remands in a factual setting like Carnegie-Mellon. Cook v. Weber, 698 F.2d
907 (7th Cir. 1983); In re Greyhound Lines, Inc., 598 F.2d 883 (5th Cir. 1979).
26 Carnegie-Mellon, 108 S. Ct. at 621.
27 In so concluding, the Court was required to do an elegant sidestep around contrary language
in Thermtron: "[W]e are not convinced that Congress ever intended to extend carte blanche authority to the district courts to revise the federal statutes governing removal by remanding cases on
grounds that seem justifiable to them but which are not recognized by the controlling statute."
Thermtron, 423 U.S. at 351. The willingness to do just that in Carnegie-Mellonis in striking contrast to
the Court's refusal to read its own Rule expansively in Schiavone.
28 See Carnegie-Mellon, 108 S. Ct. at 621 n.11.
29 The Court identified the principles underlying the pendent jurisdiction doctrine as "economy, convenience, fairness, and comity." Id at 619. The Court then asserted that advancement of
these principles may require an expansive view of pendent jurisdiction, including the exercise by a
district court of discretionary power: "Because in some circumstances a remand of a removed case

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63:720

As previously indicated, I do not wish to criticize the Court's conclusion in Carnegie-Mellon. However, in light of the expansive view the Court
found itself free to take of a statute,3 0 recognizing judicial authority to
remand which is found nowhere in the statutory scheme created by Congress, I would argue that it follows that there is even greater opportunity
for liberal interpretation of one of the Federal Rules, which the Court
itself was institutionally responsible for promulgating.
The balance of this paper offers some justifications for this approach, as well as some suggestions of guidelines for courts to use in
employing this power. My hope, then, is that in the year 2038, when
other people are celebrating the hundredth anniversary of the Federal
Rules, Schiavone will be pointed to as an historical aberration.
My beginning point is the nature of the rulemaking process and the
way in which the Federal Rules constituted a departure from the procedural system which they replaced. As we all know, by the 1870's, the
common law pleading system-which was largely a hodgepodge of
judge-made rules, and which was the result of an evolutionary process
over the centuries rather than a unified approach to procedure that was
designed to have the various requirements dovetail with each other-had
been supplanted in a majority of the jurisdictions in the United States by
codes, modelled to a greater or lesser degree on New York's original
Field Code. Pursuant to the federal Conformity Act of 1872, 3 1 at least
with respect to common law actions, the rules of procedure in the federal
courts were the rules of the state courts in which the federal court was
located.3 2 The obvious point is that since, by definition, codes are the
product of legislative enactment, for the approximately seventy years culminating in 1938, the principal standards for governing procedure in
both the federal and state courts were statutes. If doubts arose about the
meaning or scope of a controlling provision in a code, it was important to
know just what the particular statutory provision indicated.
involving pendent claims will better accomodate these values than will dismissal of the case, the
animating principle behind the pendent jurisdiction doctrine supports giving a district court discretion to remand when the exercise of pendent jurisdiction is inappropriate." Id.
This approach is in obvious contrast to Schiavone. There, the Court failed to consider the purposes for which the second sentence of Rule 15(c) was added in 1966 and did not even address the
question of whether its reading of that Rule would be consistent with the values of the Federal Rules
in general.
30 The Court gave an expansive reading to other jurisdictional provisions in Title 28 in another
case this Term, K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 108 S.Ct. 950 (1988). In dissent,Justice Scalia argued
that this liberal interpretation of the statute was contrary to its "plain meaning": "[T]he jurisdictional question, if decided incorrectly, may generate uncertainty and hence litigation into the indefinite future. In my view, the Court's resolution of this question strains the plain language of the
statute, and blurs a clear jurisdictional line that Congress has established." a at 960 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
31 Act ofJune 1, 1872, ch. 255. §§ 5, 6, 17 Stat. 196, 197 (repealed 1948).
32 In interesting contrast to the conformity requirement with respect to actions at common law,
the federal courts followed their own procedure for actions in equity. Moreover, these standards
were the product of rulemaking by the Supreme Court. The first equity rules for the lower federal
courts were promulgated in 1822, and these were replaced by another set of rules in 1842. In the
early twentieth century, the Supreme Court undertook a comprehensive revision of these rules; the
Equity Rules of 1912 remained in force, with only minor amendments, until they were superseded by
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938. H. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 578-79 (1953).
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The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure marked an important departure from this system. The history leading up to the enactment of the
Rules Enabling Act33 in 1934 has been well described elsewhere3 4 and
need not be repeated here. As we know, however, the import of that
statute was that Congress-expressly delegated power-authority-to the
Supreme Court to draft and prescribe rules to govern the practice and
procedure in the federal district courts and in the courts of appeals. 3 5
The reality of rulemaking is that the Supreme Court itself did not,
and still does not, actually draft the Rules. Rather, the Court acted as
bodies charged with drafting a document often do: It appointed a committee to produce an initial draft. These proposed rules were then published for public comment and were revised, first by the Advisory
Committee and then by the Court itself. Finally, however, they were
adopted and promulgated by the Supreme Court. Although the Rules
Enabling Act also provides that these Rules must be reported to Congress and that a period of time for negative congressional action must
elapse before they actually become effective,3 6 in 1938 Congress took no
such step, and after the expiration of the provided time, the Rules did go
37
into effect.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, then, are, at least in part, the
product of the Supreme Court's own activities, and they reflect the
Court's view of an appropriate and efficient set of rules for governing
practice and procedure in the federal courts. Equally important, as an
institutional matter, it is the Supreme Court itself which has been given
the responsibility for promulgating and implementing the Rules. That
the Court has taken this responsibility seriously, and that it is not merely
rubberstamping proposals of the Advisory Committee, is demonstrated
in part by the frequent instances in which members of the Court have
dissented from proposed amendments to the Rules.3 8
33 Act ofJune 19, 1934, ch. 651, §§ 1, 2, 48 Stat. 1064, presently codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2072
(1982) (as amended).
34 See, e.g., Burbank, The Rules EnablingAct of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1015 (1982).
35 The Act provided in part: "The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe by general
rules, the forms of process, writs, pleadings, and motions, and the practice and procedure of the
district courts and courts of appeals of the United States in civil actions .... 28 U.S.C. § 2072
(1982).
36 As amended, the Rules Enabling Act now provides: "Such rules shall not take effect until they
have been reported to Congress by the ChiefJustice at or after the beginning of a regular session
thereof but not later than the first day of May, and until the expiration of ninety days after they have
been thus reported." I&
The Act as passed in 1934 stated: "Such united rules shall not take effect until they have been
reported to Congress by the Attorney General at the beginning of a regular session thereof and until
after the close of such session." Act ofJune 19, 1934, ch. 651, § 2, 48 Stat. 1064.
37 Congress has blocked the effective date of proposed revisions to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure on only two occasions, and neither instance involved Rule 15. In 1973, the Court had
promulgated the Federal Rules of Evidence; a few conforming changes in the Rules of Civil Procedure were offered at the same time. The effectiveness of these Rules of Evidence and the conforming amendments was blocked by Act of Mar. 30, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-12, 87 Stat. 9. More
recently, Congress delayed the effective date of proposed amendments to Rule 4, which deals with
service of process. Act of Aug. 2, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-227, 96 Stat. 246.
38 See, e.g., 446 U.S. 997 (1980)(dissenting statement of Powell, J., joined by Stewart & Rehnquist,.JJ.); 409 U.S. 1132 (1972)(Douglas,J., dissenting); Order of March 1, 1971 (Black & Douglas,
JJ., dissenting); Order of March 30, 1970 (Black & Douglas, JJ., dissenting); 383 U.S. 1031, 1089
(1966)(Douglas, J., dissenting in part); 383 U.S. 1031, 1032 (1966)(Black, J., dissenting); 374 U.S.
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Since 1942, the Supreme Court has employed a Standing Committee
on Federal Rules of Practice and Procedure, as well as the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, to consider additions or revisions to the Rules.
Since 1958, proposed rules, or amendments to the Rules, are also considered by the United States Judicial Conference before ultimate adoption by the Supreme Court.3 9 The version of Rule 15(c) which was at
issue in Schiavone was in fact the product of such a mechanism for change
in the Rules, having become effective in 1966. While the Supreme Court
relied on the Advisory Committee for the initial drafting of the revision
and for receiving and reacting to public comments, the amended Rule
was also promulgated by the Court itself. In short, Rule 15(c), like all of
the Federal Rules, is a standard which the Court itself has created. It
therefore has broad freedom in its interpretation, since as an institutional
matter it is reviewing acts which Congress has authorized it to
40
undertake.
My second point-which contrasts the role of courts in interpreting
the Federal Rules with their role in interpreting statutes-flows directly
from this first observation. When a court is faced with ambiguous or
unclear language in a statute-whether it is a procedural code or the Environmental Protection Act-it is involved in part in thejob of discerning
the intent of the legislators who drafted and then voted for or against the
statute, and perhaps even the views of the executive who signed the bill.
Examination of speeches on the floors of Congress or the state legislature, testimony of witnesses before committees, views expressed in committee reports, and many other sources of information can be consulted
to make this determination. However, in interpreting the Federal Rules,
none of this is necessary. The Supreme Court need ask no more than
what the promulgating authority itself sought to accomplish. 4 1 And,
since it is the Supreme Court which had the responsibility for promulgating the Rule under scrutiny, the historical views of the Advisory Committee-which merely drafted the Rule-of its meaning should be entitled
only to limited weight. They may properly be given regard along with
861, 865 (1963)(statement of Black & Douglas, JJ.); 368 U.S. 1012 (1961)(statements of Black &
Douglas, JJ.). These orders are collected in 12 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE: CIVIL Appendix B (1973).
39 The system for revising and amending the Rules is described in W. BROWN, FEDERAL
RULEMAKING: PROBLEMS AND POSSIBILITIES 5-34 (Fed.Jud. Center 1981); see also Weinstein, Reform of

Federal Court Rulemaking Procedures, 76 COLUM. L. REv. 905 (1976).
40 See generally 2 J. MOORE &J. LUCAS, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE

1.13 (2d ed. 1987); 4 C.

WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1029 (2d ed. 1987).
41 The Court in Schiavone seems to have missed this point. The final paragraph of the majority

opinion stated: "The linchpin is notice, and notice within the limitations period. Of course, there is
an element of arbitrariness here, but that is a characteristic of any limitations period. And it is an
arbitrariness imposed by the legislature and not by the judicial process." Shiavone, 477 U.S. at 31. It
is obvious, however, that the type of arbitrariness about which the plaintiffs were complaining was

not the rigid borderline which flows from any statute of limitations, rather than about an allegedly
"arbitrary" choice between one of two potentially conflicting interpretations of a Federal Rule. Furthermore, the arbitrary result the plaintiffs challenged would occur only if the relevant phrase in

Rule 15(c) was given the more restrictive interpretation, which clearly was something within the
control of the Court.
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the views of other distinguished scholars or judges, but they should not
42
to be treated as some form of controlling authority.
Taking this principle to the next step, at the later date, when the
Court is faced with the task of interpreting a Federal Rule, it should be
entitled to determine what it believes to be the problems addressed by
the Rule in question, what purposes or goals the Rule sought to accom45
plish, and which interpretation will best satisfy those needs today.
Although the Court admittedly should not use a litigated dispute as the
occasion to rewrite one of the Federal Rules, it clearly can and should
look both to the purpose and the intended effect of the Rule to aid in
44
interpreting its language and in applying it to the case in dispute.
Other problems are also eliminated when courts are interpreting the
Federal Rules rather than statutes. The enactment of statutes is, under
article I, a prerogative of Congress; approval of those bills, prior to their
becoming effective, is, under article II, the role of the President. 4 5 Pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act, howeyer, Congress has vested all
rulemaking authority in the Supreme Court, subject only to a limited
form of potential legislative veto. Therefore, when the Court interprets
the Federal Rules, it need not concern itself with issues of separation of
powers and deference to the other two branches of the federal government. Through the combination of its own article III powers and these
delegated powers, 4 6 the Court has full and independent authority to decide what rules of procedure are best and which interpretation of an ex4 isting Federal Rule will best serve these needs and goals.
42 See C.J. Wieland & Son Dairy Prods. Co. v. Wickard, 4 F.R.D. 250, 252 (E.D. Wis. 1945). See
also supra note 15 and accompanying text.
43 See generally Smith v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 22 F.R.D. 108, 113 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) ("Rules of
procedure, like principles of substantive law, should be interpreted to meet the challenge of changing conditions of life and litigation.").
44 See Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 298 (1969) (emphasis added):
We have no power to rewrite the Rules byjudicial interpretations. We have no power
to decide [to expand a Rule] unless, on conventional principles of statutory construction,
we can properly conclude that the literal language or the intended effect of the Rules indicates that this was within the purpose of the draftsmen or the congressionalunderstanding.
This passage indicates that already in 1969, the Supreme Court misapprehended its role as
interpreter of the Federal Rules. Since the Court had itself promulgated the Rule in question, it
should not have been necessary to have the support of the Rule's draftsmen to reach a particular
result. Even more curious is the Court's reference to "congressional understanding." Once a Rule
has been promulgated, it of course must be transmitted to Congress for possible legislative veto
before the Rule becomes effective, see supra note 36; however, congressional "inaction" certainly
indicates little about congressional "understanding" of the interpretation or purpose of a particular
Rule.
An analogous problem arises in the administrative agency setting: may an agency articulate a
new rule of law in an adjudicatory proceeding, or must it resort to rulemaking? While showing a
preference for rulemaking, the Supreme Court has offered agencies the former option as well. SEC
v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947). See generally B. ScHwARTz, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 191-96 (2d
ed. 1984).
45 Of course, if the president vetoes a bill and the Congress overrides the veto, these powers
become exclusively legislative.
46 Although it is possible that the promulgation of a particular Rule may exceed the powers
delegated to the Court by the Rules Enabling Act, there appears to be a strong presumption in favor
of the propriety of the Rules. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460,464-65 (1965); Mississippi Publishing Co. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438,443-46 (1946); Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 9-16 (1941).
In any event, there seems no question that Rule 15(c) is properly within the delegated authority of
the Act.
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Finally, when the issue before the court involves the meaning of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, federalism concerns usually do not
arise. When the case before the court involves issues of state lawwhether it involves the interpretation of a state statute or involves the
interpretation of common law doctrines of tort or contract law-the interests of the state in the interpretation of that law may be implicated. As
the Court stated in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 47 there is no federal
general common law; even under the earlier regime of Swift v. Tyson, 48
federal courts deferred to state statutory law. Both the Rules of Decision
Act 49 and the constitutional principles alluded to in Erie compel federal
courts to defer to state views about the meaning of state statutes or state
common law. As just noted, when the federal courts are interpreting the
Federal Rules, however, they are acting pursuant to authority conferred
both by article I and article III of the Constitution and need have no fear
about trampling on these state interests. 5 0
What are the implications of these conclusions for a court's task of
interpreting one of the Federal Rules? First, I think it is not inappropriate to bear in mind the general rule of construction found in Rule 1that the Rules "shall be construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action. '51 Although this principle obviously does not provide an answer to any specific question of the
interpretation of any of the Federal Rules, it defines a context or, if you
will, a predisposition against unnecessarily rigid or grudging interpretations of the Rules.
Second, the Court has often recognized that the Federal Rules are
not ends in themselves, merely operating as the rules of a game, the object of which is to cross unscathed from pleadings to judgment without
falling into unsuspected traps. 52 Rather, rules of procedure are merely
vehicles for the resolution of a dispute on the merits. Naturally, in
resolving that dispute, it is important that the parties have an opportunity to present their claims or defenses fully and that the proceedings
move forward in a fair, expeditious, and inexpensive manner. If those
goals are met, however, additional procedural hoops through which the
parties must jump are inappropriate.
47 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
48 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
49 Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 73, 92, presently codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1652
(1982).
50 But see supra note 18 (noting potential Erie questions, which Court did not consider).
Schiavone therefore presents an interesting contrast to such cases as Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S.

460 (1965) and Ragan v. Merchants Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949). There, the party opposing
the application of the Federal Rule was arguing that the Rule was too broad, and that such a broad
interpretation would either violate the Court's rulemaking power under the Rules Enabling Act or
would violate Erie principles by infringing on a state's control of the interpretation of its law. Here,
however, the Court's view of the scope of the Rule was unduly timid; the Court gave Rule 15(c) the
narrowest possible reading, and it limited its own power to interpret the Rules liberally.
51 FED. R. Civ. P. 1. In addition, Rule 8(f) states: "All pleadings shall be so construed as to do
substantial justice." FED. R. Civ. P. 8(f).
52 See, e.g., Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 383 U.S. 363, 373 (1966); Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S.
178, 181 (1962); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 48 (1957).
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Finally, in any decision, the parties, the bench, and the bar are entitled to candor with regard to the explanations for the Court's decision.
Hidden agendas, reliance on rigid maxims, or substitution of labeling for
analysis are what we academics expose and challenge in our law students.
They are far less tolerable when they come from the United States
Supreme Court.
Let me apply these principles to the Court's decision in Schiavone.
Obviously, the function of a statute of limitations is to provide some admittedly arbitrary date by which the plaintiff must commence the action.
At some point, defendants are entitled to repose, knowing that the threat
of litigation no longer hangs over their heads, and the courts (and legislatures acting on their behalf) are entitled as well to take steps to lessen
the likelihood of trials where memories of witnesses grow dim and where
evidence is unreliable or unavailable. Two additional considerations are
relevant, however. First, the Federal Rules recognize that service of process often takes a bit of time and that it cannot be accomplished simultaneously with the filing of the complaint with the court. Therefore, Rules
3 and 4 provide that if the complaint is filed within the statutory period,
the action will still be timely if service of process takes place within 120
days of that date.5 3 In Schiavone, that time period was indeed satisfied,
albeit initially on the wrongly named defendant. Second, in the very process of drafting and adopting Rule 15(c), the Court recognized that on
occasion a plaintiff may initially sue a wrong party, but will then recognize and correct the mistake before the intended party has been disadvantaged or prejudiced.
If the purpose of Rule 15(c)-and I emphasize that one should never
lose sight of the purposes behind the Rules in interpreting their language-is to ensure that an action should proceed if the intended defendant receives timely notice of the nature and pendency of the action
against it and also to ensure that the merits of the claim should not be
foreclosed because of this "procedural error," then the Court in Schiavone obviously ignored these objectives. Instead, it substituted a rigid
requirement which transcended the statute of limitations; adherence to
the rules of the game is essential, and failure so to adhere forecloses further consideration of the lawsuit-no matter how meritorious the plaintiffs' claim may have been.
As to candor in explaining the Court's result: I wonder how many
other people were struck by the "lineup" of some members of the Court
in the Schiavone opinion. As noted earlier,54 the Court indicated that the
choice was not between a "liberal" view-which would have allowed the
relation back of the amended complaint-and a "technical" interpretation-which led to the majority's result of no amendment and hence dismissal of the action. Two of the members of the Court taking the
"technical" approach were Justices Brennan and Marshall, who are usually thought to be the two most liberal members of the Court; on the
other hand, former Chief Justice Burger joined the dissent, arguing for
53 The majority of states have -similar provisions. See Lewis, supra note 14, at 1552-53.
54 See supra text accompanying note 12.
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the so-called "liberal" position. Now, however, note the substantive nature of the claim-an action for libel. By supporting dismissal, the majority prevented the plaintiffs from asserting a claim against Fortune
Magazine, and so arguably first amendment interests were advanced.
Obviously, I do not know if this was a moving factor foi- some members
of the Schiavone majority. However, I grope and grapple and speculate,
only because the Court's opinion itself is so unilluminating. Other than
references to the "plain meaning" of the Rule and quotations of ambiguous language in the Advisory Committee's Notes, there is nothing else to
explain or support the Court's result. If readers of opinions are not to
look for such alternative, somewhat Machiavellian, explanations, the
Court's rationale must be explicated more fully and honestly.
I conclude with the bad pun which forms the basis of the title of this
paper-that Schiavone is an "un-Fortune-ate" decision. Although criticism
is both easy and popular, it is my belief that the Supreme Court has generally done an excellent job of undertaking its role of promulgating, revising, and interpreting the Federal Rules. Schiavone is a rare exception
to this assertion. I only hope that the Court continues its general practice of giving the Federal Rules an expansive reading, recognizing them
as an efficient means to the far more important end-resolving litigated
disputes on their merits.

